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Statutes of Liberty?
SEEKING JUSTICE UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
WHEN DIPLOMATS TRAFFIC IN PERSONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Bangladeshi woman signed her contract for a job in
the United States (“U.S.”) as a domestic worker for a Bahraini
diplomat with a thumbprint because she could not read or
write.1 Upon her arrival she became “a virtual prisoner in a
high-rise apartment on Manhattan’s East Side,”2 her monthly
pay sent to her husband back in Bangladesh. Forbidden to
leave the apartment alone, she escaped while her employers
were away and only after a child in the building showed her
how to operate an elevator.3
A woman from Bolivia was paid less than a dollar an
hour when she came to the U.S. to work for a human rights
attorney employed by the Organization of American States
(“O.A.S.”).4 When a friend of the family she worked for raped
her, her employer offered her no assistance and refused to take
her for medical attention.5 She later testified to Congress
about her experiences, saying, “I have suffered more abuse
than I have been able to explain.”6
These are just a few of many similar stories taking place
in the U.S.,7 often in cities like New York and Washington, D.C.
1
Somini Sengupta, An Immigrant’s Legal Enterprise; In Suing Employer,
Maid Fights Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at B1.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Abid Aslam, Plight of Domestic Workers Wins Congressional Ear,
INTERPRESS SERVICE (Feb. 16, 2000), http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wbimf/
ips021600.html.pf.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Another worker was promised $2000 monthly but paid $200 to $300
monthly instead, which she never saw because it was sent directly to her husband in
India. She worked 18 hours a day and “[b]y the end of her years with the family,” her
employer “raped her on a regular basis.” Matt Kelley, Some Embassy Workers Enslave
Domestic Help, Enjoy Immunity, THE NEWSTANDARD, Jun. 28, 2005,
http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/1985/printmode/true.
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that house international organizations, missions and
embassies.8 While the conduct of exploitative employers like
these is illegal in the U.S.,9 diplomats, United Nations (“U.N.”)
officials, and representatives of other international
organizations who victimize domestic workers are often
immune from U.S. criminal or civil jurisdiction because of the
internationally recognized doctrine of diplomatic immunity.10
These instances shock the conscience, particularly in light of
the purposes of the organizations that these immunized
officials work for.11 Organizations like the U.N. and the O.A.S.
aspire to safeguard human rights and eradicate practices
resembling slavery.12
Thousands of domestic workers enter the U.S. legally
every year on special visas secured by diplomats or officials of
international organizations who have agreed to employ them.13
Although the U.S. government sanctions this system of
importation of domestic servants, often employers induce
workers to travel to the U.S. through fraud or coercion and
then subject their servants upon arrival to working conditions
“akin to slavery.”14 This type of trafficking is fueled by a
8
See Lora Jo Foo, The Trafficking of Asian Women, in ASIAN AMERICAN
WOMEN: ISSUES, CONCERNS, AND RESPONSIVE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 47,
51 (Ford Foundation 2002); Colbert I. King, Editorial, The Slaves in Our Midst, WASH.
POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at A21; Lena H. Sun, “Modern-Day Slavery” Prompts Rescue
Efforts; Groups Target Abuse of Foreign Maids, Nannies, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at
A1.
9
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-1590 (2000).
10
See Foo, supra note 8.
11
Margaret Murphy, Modern Day Slavery: The Trafficking of Women to the
United States, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 13-14 (2000).
12
See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 3.
13
Aslam, supra note 4; Murphy, supra note 11, at 13.
14
Murphy, supra note 11, at 13; see Marilyn R. Walter, Trafficking in
Humans: Now and in Herman Melville’s Benito Cereno, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
135, 136 (2005) (“Conditions approximating slavery and the slave trade exist today in
the trafficking in human beings.”); A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and
Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 809, 824 (2005) (describing the “fundamental characteristics of
ownership—total dominion over one’s autonomy through the use of coercion for
purposes of economic/sexual exploitation” used to identify “modern forms of slavery”);
Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers with Special Visas in the United
States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 2001, at 20 [hereinafter Hidden in the Home] (“In
the most egregious cases, a domestic worker’s abusive employment conditions may
combine to create a situation of servitude.”); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn,
Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the
United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (2004) (“[h]uman trafficking is also
called ‘modern day slavery’”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Report of the
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, U.N.
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dangerous combination of easily available visas for
international domestic workers15 and immunity from criminal
and civil liability for diplomats,16 U.N. officials,17 and
representatives to certain other international organizations.18
While the groundbreaking Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 200019 forcefully outlawed involuntary
servitude and other crimes of human trafficking to the U.S.,
prosecutions of the new trafficking crimes are often barred by
diplomatic immunity.20 The Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 200321 created civil remedies for victims
of trafficking which are similarly barred in most cases where a

Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/31 (June 27, 2003) (“forced labour is a contemporary form of
slavery”).
15
A-3 visas, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“I.N.A.”)
§ 101(a)(15)(A)(iii) (codified in title 8 of the U.S.C.), are issued to live-in workers for
ambassadors, diplomats, and consuls. G-5 visas, under I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(G)(v), are
issued to live-in workers for employees of international organizations or of foreign
missions to international organizations. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 4
(explaining the types of special visas and their limitations).
16
“Under international law, diplomatic agents are immune from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state. Diplomatic agents are also immune, with limited
exception, from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the state. The immunities of
diplomatic agents extend to the members of their family forming part of their
household.” 7 FAM 1116.2-2 (Nov. 30, 1995) (emphasis in original).
17
“Under the UN Headquarters Agreement, certain individuals are entitled to
the same privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic envoys.” 7 FAM 1116.2-3
(Nov. 30, 1995) (emphasis in original).
18
Some representatives and officials of “organizations including, but not
limited to, the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, and
the World Bank” are also immune, but “[t]he number of such Resident Representatives
and Officials entitled to diplomatic immunity is small.” 7 FAM 1116.2-4 (Nov. 30,
1995) (emphasis in original).
19
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000).
20
See Nidhi Kumar, Note, Reinforcing Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment Principles in the Twenty-First Century: How to Punish Today’s Masters
and Compensate Their Immigrant Slaves, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 303, 306 (2005) (“the
exemption of foreign officials from criminal suit is a severe obstacle in redressing the
grievances of immigrant workers in the United States”); Chisun Lee, Runaway Justice:
Botswanan Domestic Sues UN Diplomat for “Involuntary Servitude”, VILLAGE VOICE,
July 25-31, 2001 (describing immunity obstacles to a civil suit alleging involuntary
servitude brought by a domestic worker on a G-5 visa against the deputy permanent
representative for Botswana’s mission to the U.N.); see also infra Part IV.B.
21
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (Dec. 19, 2003). Additionally, the recently passed Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 972, 109th Cong. (2005), provides
appropriations for anti-trafficking efforts in the fiscal years of 2006 and 2007 and was
signed by President Bush on January 10, 2006. Press Release, Office of the Press
Secretary, President Signs H.R. 972, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/
20060110-3.html.
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trafficker asserts diplomatic immunity.22 Immunity too often
shields diplomats and officials of international organizations
residing in the U.S. who illegally traffic in domestic servants.23
These violations are particularly egregious in light of the role
many of these perpetrators play within organizations
philosophically dedicated to combating human rights
violations.
This Note details the causes and effects of this problem
and demands that immunized foreign officials who traffic
domestic workers face consequences. Part II briefly outlines
the definition of human trafficking and then focuses on
trafficking to the U.S. for purposes of domestic servitude, the
type of trafficking most frequently committed by diplomats and
employees of international organizations. Part III covers the
history of U.S. and international law applicable to human
trafficking and describes the passage of federal anti-trafficking
legislation in 2000 and 2003, as well as the impact and utility
of the new laws. It focuses on those provisions of the antitrafficking legislation that are particularly relevant to
diplomatic trafficking, and discusses Congress’s intent. Part
IV explains the special visas diplomats and foreign officials
may use to bring domestic workers to the U.S. and outlines the
levels of immunity that they may invoke, a combination which
facilitates this type of trafficking. It explores the prevalence of
trafficking for the purposes of domestic servitude by diplomats
and other immunized officials and cites examples of cases
dismissed on grounds of diplomatic immunity.
Part V
evaluates several solutions geared to each aspect of this legal
problem and argues that in grave cases where diplomats
essentially enslave their victims, the jus cogens principle of
international law allows U.S. jurisdiction over such traffickers
in spite of their diplomatic immunity.

22

See infra Part IV.B.
See HumanTrafficking.com, Human Trafficking 101: Who Are the
Traffickers?, http://www.humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/trafficking_ht3/who_
traffickers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007) (noting that “[d]iplomatic immunity also has
been an obstacle to bringing justice” in the cases of victims of domestic servitude
trafficked to the U.S. by diplomats or employees of international organizations).
23
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HUMAN TRAFFICKING TO THE U.S. FOR PURPOSES OF
DOMESTIC SERVITUDE

A.

Defining Human Trafficking

1143

Trafficking in persons is “the modern day form of
slavery.”24
In addition to transporting individuals across
borders, traffickers commonly make fraudulent promises to
victims and then subject them to working conditions to which
they never agreed and never would have consented.25 While
some trafficking cases involve kidnapping or forcible abduction,
most trafficking victims arrive willingly but lack knowledge of
the terms and conditions they will face.26 They may be
promised wages that are never paid and forced to labor without
sufficient sleep or food.27 Among an estimated 50,000 victims
trafficked into the U.S. each year,28 about half are trafficked for
sexual exploitation and about half for labor exploitation, which
includes sweatshops, agriculture and domestic service.29
The perpetrators of trafficking include transnational
organized crime rings, smaller, family-run operations,30 and
diplomats.31 The desire for cheap or free labor typically

24
Stephanie Richard, Note, State Legislation and Human Trafficking:
Helpful or Harmful?, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 447 (2005); see supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
25
Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders: II. The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2184-85 (2005) [hereinafter Developments in the
Law]. “Though the definition of trafficking varies, all definitions include the movement
of human beings across national or international borders using coercion or deception
for the purpose of exploiting their labor.” Walter, supra note 14, at 136-37.
26
FRANCIS T. MIKO, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. RL30545, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS: THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 8 (2006); see Developments in the
Law, supra note 25, at 2184-85.
27
Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31,
47 (2002).
28
Bo Cooper, A New Approach to Protection and Law Enforcement Under the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 51 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (2002).
29
Richard, supra note 24, at 450. “Given the factors that motivate and create
opportunities for traffickers to take advantage of individuals, human trafficking into
the United States will not decrease anytime soon.” Id.
30
Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 6.
31
“Traffickers wear many different faces: members of organized criminal
networks, freelancers, relatives, neighbors, friends, village chiefs, community leaders,
shop owners, employees (e.g., fraudulent employment, modeling, travel and
matchmaking agencies), diplomats, agricultural business operatives, and more.”
International
Rescue
Committee,
Trafficking
in
the
United
States,
http://www.theirc.org/index.cfm/wwwID/1886 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (emphasis
added).
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motivates all of these actors.32 The complex forces tied into
today’s trafficking epidemic are “personal, cultural, and
economic.”33 A larger trend known as the feminization of
migration34 further facilitates trafficking.
While linked to the forces which drive economic
migration, trafficking must be distinguished from ordinary
migration and smuggling.35 Trafficking differs from other
movement across borders because an individual’s decision to
migrate includes the element of a trafficker’s inducement by
means of “deception . . . coercion, violence or threat of
violence.”36 Statistics on trafficking tend to be underestimates
because of the underground nature of the crime and fear of
reporting by its victims.37 Estimates of the annual number of
victims trafficked into the U.S. range from 14,500 to 50,000
individuals.38 However, since 2001 the U.S. government has
located only 611 trafficking victims.39
32

“The basic causes of trafficking are greed on one side and desperation on
the other.” Walter, supra note 14, at 139.
33
Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2182-83.
34
As Elena Tiuriukanova describes:
The feminization of migration (the increasing percentage of women in the
migrant population), is recognized by experts as characteristic of a new stage
in the development of international labor migration. In large part, this is
related to structural changes in the world economy accompanying the
globalization processes: relative reduction of the industrial sector in the
postwar period and the growth of the service sector.
Elena Tiuriukanova, Female Labor Migration Trends and Human Trafficking: Policy
Recommendations, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 95, 98 (Sally
Stoecker & Louise Shelley, eds., 2005). “The difference in the standard of living and
economic opportunities among different countries is the main moving force for such
migration.” Id. at 97. See Rassam, supra note 14, at 825-26 (“[F]or the first time in
history, women comprise the largest sector of migrant labor both domestically and
internationally.”).
35
Joshi, supra note 27, at 32.
36
Id.
37
There is also a general “lack of precision and methodological transparency
in providing estimates of the number of trafficked victims in North America.” Elzbieta
M. Gozdziak & Elizabeth A. Collett, Research on Human Trafficking in North America:
A Review of Literature, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, DATA AND
RESEARCH ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A GLOBAL SURVEY 116 (2005).
38
The U.S. Department of Justice posits that traffickers import between
14,500 and 17,500 humans into the U.S. annually. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ASSESSMENT
OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 4 (Sept. 2005)
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING]. See Free the
Slaves, Washington, D.C., and the Human Rights Center of the University of
California, Berkeley, Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 47, 58 (2005) [hereinafter Hidden Slaves]. The U.S. Department of State
puts the number at 17,500. Miko, supra note 26, at 7. Congress found in 2000 that
“[a]pproximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each
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Domestic Servitude

This Note focuses on trafficking for purposes of domestic
servitude,40 the type of trafficking in which individuals who
assert diplomatic immunity are most frequently implicated.41
Trafficking for the purpose of human servitude typically results
in a dependent, economically abusive labor relationship
between an employer and a worker with no means of escape.42
When an employer completely controls a worker’s life through
tactics such as passport confiscation,43 abuse, and isolation,44
domestic servitude becomes a modern day form of slavery.45
“[M]odern day slavery, while not always overtly racist, often
relies on ‘some form of categorical exploitation . . . of a
particularly weak subgroup,’ including women, religious
minorities, indigenous people and ethnic minorities or, as in
the case of trafficking, persons from less developed countries.”46
Domestic workers are particularly susceptible to trafficking
and other forms of abuse in part because domestic jobs tend to
be less visible, less formal, and subject to fewer legal

year.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 102(b)(1), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (Oct. 28, 2000).
39
ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING, supra note 38, at 4.
40
“Domestic workers whose labor conditions constitute servitude or forced
labor are frequently trafficking victims.” Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 20.
41
Even after the Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers reported to the
UNCHR in 2004 cases of human rights abuses “involving women working for
diplomatic staff or staff in international organizations . . . many migrant domestic
workers employed by the United Nations’ own staff and the staff of country missions to
the UN are still suffering exploitation and being denied their human rights.” U.N.
Comm’n on Human Rights, Written Statement Jointly Submitted by Global Rights and
the ACLU, Non-governmental Organizations in Special Consultative Status, Apr. 7,
2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/written%20statement%20on%20
migrant%20workers%20un.pdf [hereinafter Statement Submitted by Global Rights and
the ACLU].
42
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 50.
43
See Sun, supra note 8.
44
Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and
A Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 994 (2002).
45
See id. at 983 (analogizing trafficking victims to antebellum slaves because
“[t]heir lives are subject to complete control by their ‘bosses’; their passports are taken
upon arrival, they are physically isolated and abused and are otherwise denied the
basic freedoms essential to their personhood.”).
46
Rassam, supra note 14, at 824 (quoting James G. Wilson, Why the
International Criminal Court Should Have Jurisdiction Over Contemporary Forms of
Slavery, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 180 (2001));
see Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery on its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/34 (July 7, 2005)
(focusing the attention of the Working Group in its 2006 session on issues including
trafficking in persons, forced labor, and exploitation of domestic workers).
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protections.47 Often the arrangements for a domestic worker
position are made through an acquaintance or by the worker’s
parents overseas.48 Diplomats and officials of international
organizations traffic domestic workers with relative ease
because of their access to special visas.49 The relative lack of
interest in trafficking for labor servitude as opposed to
trafficking for sexual exploitation50 compounds the problem of
eliminating the trafficking of domestic workers by keeping it
under the global radar.
III.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND U.S. LAW

A.

Early U.S. Law

In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery
in the U.S..51 Congress criminalized peonage and involuntary
servitude in 1948.52 These laws, passed pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment, were sometimes used to prosecute
crimes known today as trafficking offenses.53 But the U.S.
Supreme Court subsequently narrowly interpreted the statute
prohibiting involuntary servitude54 by holding in U.S. v.
Kozminski that “the term ‘involuntary servitude’ necessarily
means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to
work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical
restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion
through law or the legal process.”55 The Kozminski decision
47
“Jobs in the service industry, where most women-migrants are employed,
have particular features that make workers more vulnerable and less socially protected
than workers in other sectors. . . . That is especially the case with so-called ‘domestic
services.’” Tiuriukanova, supra note 34, at 99.
48
See Aslam, supra note 4.
49
Detailed infra in Part IV.A.
50
Gozdziak & Collett, supra note 37, at 117. Lack of research interest
corresponds to the lack of prosecutorial interest in trafficking cases that do not involve
sexual exploitation, as discussed infra in Part III.D & E.
51
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
52
18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) outlaws peonage. Peonage is “the practice of
holding someone captive to work off a debt.” Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 67. 18
U.S.C. § 1583 and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 outlaw involuntary servitude, which forces an
individual “to work against his or her will.” Id. at 67 & n.64. See also Michael R.
Candes, Comment, The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Will
it Become the Thirteenth Amendment of the Twenty-First Century?, 32 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 571, 576 (2001) (referring to the criminalization of peonage and involuntary
servitude).
53
See Candes, supra note 52.
54
18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000).
55
U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); see also U.S. v. Alzanki, 54
F.3d 994, 1000-01 (1st Cir. 1995).
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prevented use of the statute to prosecute individuals who held
their victims in servitude through “psychological coercion or
The increasing numbers of traffickers who
trickery.”56
employed more subtle tactics of “psychological and economic
coercion,”57 as opposed to physical force or threat of physical
force, were not covered by U.S. criminal law. Thus, Kozminski
contributed to a growing need for legislation that might
adequately combat the continually increasing flow of human
trafficking to the U.S.58
B.

Applicable International Law

From 1926 on, members of the international community
ratified numerous instruments outlawing slavery and
analogous practices,59 such as the League of Nations Slavery
Convention of 1926,60 the U.N. Supplementary Convention on
Slavery of 1956,61 and the International Labour Organization
Forced Labour Convention No. 29.62 During the twentieth
century the trend in exploitation of people shifted globally from
chattel slavery63 to trafficking in persons—an evolution from
ownership and control to movement and commerce.64 The first
treaties to address trafficking by name were limited in scope to
The 1949 U.N. Convention for the
sex trafficking.65

56

Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 67 & n.65.
Candes, supra note 52, at 578.
58
See id. at 586.
59
Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 68.
60
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 60
L.N.T.S. 253.
61
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266
U.N.T.S. 3.
62
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55.
63
“First generation slavery was, of course, antebellum chattel slavery in the
United States, with its immediately recognizable and monstrous images of the
auctioneer’s block, shackle and whip.” Azmy, supra note 44, at 987.
64
As Baher Azmy notes:
57

Global capitalism has organized countries into unequal participants and
expanded broad structural, hierarchical links between poor, sending
countries, and rich, receiving countries. Within this international system, a
major instrument for moving humans has been organized criminal
enterprises of various sizes and degrees of sophistication. The human
trafficking industry has become, in fact, one of the world’s most lucrative and
fastest growing criminal enterprises . . . .
Id. at 992 (footnote omitted).
65
Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69.
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Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others66 addressed only trafficking for the
purposes of prostitution and was “widely criticized as
ineffectual in combating trafficking.”67
The focus of such early instruments reflects the
persistent lack of attention to trafficking related to involuntary
servitude as opposed to sex trafficking,68 despite the fact that
“trafficking for purposes of forced prostitution comprises only a
small fraction” of worldwide trafficking of individuals into
conditions analogous to slavery.69 There has long been a dearth
of recognition of the roles discrimination and lack of
employment opportunities in many countries play in
susceptibility to enslavement.70 This inattention to the problem
of labor trafficking contributed to the lack of consequences for
diplomats and U.N. officials who traffic foreigners into the U.S.
to become domestic servants.
Members of the international community now recognize
that the massive growth of transnational trafficking rings can
only be checked through global cooperation.71 In 2000, the U.N.
adopted the International Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children,72 incorporating a broadened definition of trafficking
cognizant of modern realities.73 The definition of trafficking in
the Trafficking Protocol first mentions forced prostitution, but
also specifically includes “forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery [and] servitude.”74 The definition
also provides that trafficking may be effected by means “of
66

Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
67
Rassam, supra note 14, at 831. See also id. at 830-31 (noting the
Convention’s lack of a definition of “exploitation” and criticism of its obsolescence).
68
Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections
Against Trafficking for Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 55, 70 (2001) (“human rights reporting on trafficking has focused on the
sex work or sexual exploitation dimension of the practice”).
69
Rassam, supra note 14, at 811.
70
Id. at 844.
71
Walter, supra note 14, at 168 (“The impetus for the United Nations action
was the enormous growth of transnational organized crime and the recognition that
this problem could only be solved through close international cooperation.”).
72
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) [hereinafter Trafficking
Protocol].
73
See Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69.
74
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 72, art. 3(a).
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coercion . . . of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability . . . for the purpose of exploitation.”75
Significantly, the Trafficking Protocol also requires states that
ratify it to enact criminal sanctions against traffickers.76 The
Trafficking Protocol entered into force in 2003,77 and the U.S.
ratified it in November of 2005.78 111 countries are party to the
Trafficking Protocol today.79 It took the U.S. several years to
consent to this international instrument, but in 2000 Congress
had enacted a similarly expanded federal definition of
trafficking.80
C.

The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000

With strong support across party lines,81 Congress
passed the U.S.’s first and only anti-trafficking legislation,82 the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (“VTVPA”)
of 2000.83 A “bold departure”84 from prior U.S. law,85 the
VTVPA denounces trafficking in “unusually strong words”.86
The new crime, “[t]rafficking with respect to peonage, slavery,
involuntary servitude, or forced labor,” warrants a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.87 The VTVPA defines “severe
form of trafficking in persons” as:
(A) [S]ex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by
force, fraud or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform
75

Id.
Id. art. 5; see Rassam, supra note 14, at 841.
77
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/pt/crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See discussion infra Part III.C.
81
LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing
the Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 227, 242 (2003).
82
Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2188.
83
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000).
84
Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 69.
85
A number of states have now also enacted or drafted anti-trafficking
legislation. See generally Richard, supra note 24, for a discussion of the pros and cons
of such legislation.
86
“[The Act] refers to trafficking as an ‘evil’ and a ‘modern form of slavery,’
comparable to the institution outlawed in this country in 1865.” Cooper, supra note 28,
at 1045.
87
18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2000).
76
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such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for
labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage, or slavery.88

The Act also created a new crime of “forced labor,” defined as
labor or services provided or obtained:
(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that
person or another person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan or
pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did
not perform such labor or services, that person or another person
would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of
the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.89

Congress intended the forced labor provision to apply to cases
that do not rise to the level of involuntary servitude90 and
further clarified that “[i]nvoluntary servitude statutes are
intended to reach cases in which persons are held in a
condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion,”91 replacing
the Kozminski interpretation.92 The new crime of forced labor93
88
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act §§ 103(8)(A)-(B)
(emphasis added).
89
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000).
90
As stated in the legislative record:

Section 1589 is intended to address the increasingly subtle methods of
traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery, such as where
traffickers threaten harm to third persons, restrain their victims without
physical violence or injury, or threaten dire consequences by means other
than overt violence. Section 1589 will provide federal prosecutors with the
tools to combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise to the
level of involuntary servitude as defined in Kozminski. Because provisions
within section 1589 only require a showing of a threat of “serious harm,” or of
a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that such
harm would occur, federal prosecutors will not have to demonstrate physical
harm or threats of force against victims. The term “serious harm” as used in
this Act refers to a broad array of harms, including both physical and
nonphysical, and section 1589’s terms and provisions are intended to be
construed with respect to the individual circumstances of victims that are
relevant in determining whether a particular type or certain degree of harm
or coercion is sufficient to maintain or obtain a victim’s labor or services,
including the age and background of the victims.
H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
91
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(13); See also
H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 100 (“the Senate amendment provides a definition of
involuntary servitude in section 1584 to include a condition of servitude induced by
means of any act, scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that
the person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint or the
abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process”).
92
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(13).
93
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000).
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and new definition of involuntary servitude enhanced the
framework of existing law effective only against sex trafficking
and involuntary servitude effected by force or threat of physical
force.94 With these major advances, Congress intended that
more prosecutions be brought against traffickers who lure their
victims into domestic servitude, in part because it recognized
the growth in that variety of trafficking to the U.S.95
Despite the tendency of law enforcement personnel and
the general public to equate human trafficking with media
depictions of sex trafficking,96 the VTVPA broadened the
definition of trafficking and the scope of acts that warrant
prosecution. It also expanded existing federal criminal law in a
manner cognizant of the nonphysical coercion employed
effectively by sophisticated traffickers.97 Thus, the VTVPA
criminalizes the most severe forms of exploitation of domestic
workers, including the scenarios described in Part I.
Recognizing that the VTVPA focused more on the prosecution
of traffickers than on the protection of those trafficked,
Congress enhanced protections for victims when it
reauthorized the Act three years later.98
D.

The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2003

In 2003 Congress created civil remedies for trafficking
victims as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”).99 While the original VTVPA
94

See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101.
96
See, e.g., HUMAN TRAFFICKING (Lifetime Television 2005) (portraying sextrade trafficking to the U.S.).
97
Cooper, supra note 28, at 1049-50. For example, Congress found that
traffickers’ “representations to their victims that physical harm may occur to them or
others should the victim escape or attempt to escape . . . can have the same coercive
effects on victims as direct threats to inflict such harm.” Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act § 102(b)(7). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 25,
at 2197 (“[T]he benefit of the TVPA’s definition of coercion is that it simply gives more
explicit assurance that traffickers who use more subversive recruitment methods can
be punished.”).
98
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-193, § 4, 117 Stat. 2875, 2877 (Dec. 19, 2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
99
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat.
2878; 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (providing for victims of violations of the new crimes outlined in
the 2000 VTVPA the ability to “bring a civil action against the perpetrator in an
appropriate district court of the United States” and to “recover damages and
reasonable attorneys fees”). The TVPRA also loosened some of the requirements for
obtaining T visas, the remedy created in the VTVPA to allow trafficking victims to stay
in the U.S. legally if they are willing to assist in their traffickers’ prosecutions. See
95
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provided for mandatory restitution to victims in criminal cases,
“[s]ince prosecutors are mostly focused on incarceration,
restitution is easily forgotten to the detriment of the victim.”100
This civil cause of action also allows for the possibility of
recovering punitive damages and the costs of litigation,101
exceeding what might be available through restitution. The
civil setting allows victims to exercise control over their cases
in ways they cannot during criminal prosecutions, and damage
awards may both compensate the victims and deter their
traffickers from acting similarly in the future.102 Damage
awards obtained through this civil cause of action could be of
particular benefit to victims of trafficking who, even after they
are freed from a coercive situation, often lack money, a support
network, language skills, and educational resources.103 The
TVPRA also allows trafficking victims to sue their traffickers in
federal court even in the absence of an actual federal
prosecution.104 This may be particularly helpful to victims of
trafficking for purposes of domestic servitude, which receives
much less attention from prosecutors.105
E.

Implementation of the New Anti-Trafficking Legislation

Prosecution under the VTVPA has been limited106 but
continues to expand. From 2001 to 2003, a total of 32 total
trafficking cases were filed, 21 of them using the VTVPA.107
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act §4(a)(3); Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 107(e), 114 Stat. 1464, 1477
(Oct. 28, 2000) .
100
Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 16 (“[A] restitution award depends
largely on the aggressiveness of the prosecutor and the court to inform the criminal
defendant that restitution may be an element of the sentence.”).
101
Richard, supra note 24, at 455.
102
Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 16.
103
See Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 85 (“A consequence of forced labor is
that, when freed, survivors are usually left with little or no resources to rebuild their
lives.”).
104
Id. at 86.
105
See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 35 (suggesting that
governmental implementation of the VTVPA has suffered from a lack of understanding
of the law’s new definition of involuntary servitude).
106
“These crimes, though they are fairly widespread in the United States, are
not prosecuted often, due in part to the lack of tools available to prosecutors.” Candes,
supra note 52, at 575 (citation omitted). “Both the United Nations’ and American
efforts represent a positive and essential step in attacking the problem of trafficking.
Still, aggressive enforcement of the laws is not the norm internationally, and the
impact of anti-trafficking regulation has yet to be widely felt.” Walter, supra note 14,
at 168.
107
Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2198. “Because the TVPA
cannot be used to prosecute conduct that occurred prior to October 2000, its effective
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Since 2001, federal authorities have indicted, convicted, or
sentenced only 113 people on trafficking charges in the U.S.108
While the percentage of trafficking cases prosecuted pales in
comparison to the flow of trafficking,109 there are signs that the
number of prosecutions will continue to increase with each
passing year.110 In 2004, federal prosecutors filed 29 total
human trafficking cases against a total of 59 defendants.111
But, strikingly, while prosecutors charged 32 of those 59 using
provisions of the VTVPA, “all but one of [the] cases” targeted
perpetrators of trafficking for sexual exploitation.112 Even as
prosecutors attempt to hone in on trafficking, they still give
short shrift to trafficking for purposes of labor servitude.113
One common explanation for the overall lack of
prosecutorial use of the VTVPA is that trafficking
investigations take tremendous time and manpower as
compared to other criminal investigations.114 Some predict that
the trend towards providing state prosecutors with antitrafficking legislation will increase total prosecutions,
particularly since state police are often the individuals who
discover trafficking operations.115 Especially if the problem
stems from a lack of resources on the federal level, expanding
states’ abilities to prosecute should yield greater results.116 But

date, some of the cases have been brought under preexisting statutes such as the Mann
Act.” Beatrix Siman Zakhari, Legal Cases Prosecuted under the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
125, 134 (Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley eds., 2005) (footnote omitted).
108
Richard, supra note 24, at 460.
109
Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2199.
110
“Although few cases have yet resulted in convictions, the growth in the
number of cases nevertheless represents a dramatic change in U.S. response to human
trafficking.” Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley, Introduction, in HUMAN TRAFFIC AND
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 1, 3 (Sally Stoecker & Louise Shelley eds., 2005).
111
ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING, supra note 38, at 3.
112
Id. at 15.
113
Some law enforcement officials explain that “[d]omestic servitude cases are
difficult to prosecute . . . because the victims are scared to go to police and the crimes
take place behind closed doors.” Sun, supra note 8.
114
“[H]uman trafficking cases are among the most labor- and time-intensive
criminal investigations that the United States government undertakes.” Richard,
supra note 24, at 469. “Prior to the TVPA, trafficking cases did not offer sufficient
‘payoffs’ relative to the amount of time and resources that were invested. This concern
was particularly apt in trafficking cases, which necessitate enormous amounts of time
and labor . . .” Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 2200 (footnote omitted).
115
Richard, supra note 24, at 460 (“local law enforcement officers encounter
the majority of human trafficking victims”).
116
Id. (“[G]iven the labor-intensive and resource-driven nature of human
trafficking investigations, if more responsibility is spread to states for investigation
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this leaves the problem of law enforcement focus on sex
trafficking to the exclusion of labor servitude, which
contributes to the lack of remedies for domestic workers
trafficked by individuals with diplomatic immunity.
Furthermore, when fully immunized diplomats and officials of
the U.N. and other international organizations hold victims in
domestic servitude, Congress’s otherwise strong laws are
useless both to prosecutors and to trafficking victims seeking
civil remedies.117
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF DIPLOMAT TRAFFICKERS

A.

Special Visas for Domestic Workers

Diplomats and employees of international organizations
traffic domestic workers into their U.S. homes with relative
ease. With diplomatic or international official status comes
eligibility to apply for special visas in order to bring domestic
workers to the U.S.118 Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the U.S. issues A-3 visas119 to live-in workers for
ambassadors, diplomats, and consuls.120
G-5 visas121 are
furnished to live-in workers for employees of international
organizations or of foreign missions to international
organizations.122 Sometimes these dignitaries bring workers
with them from their own countries123 for the obvious reasons of
culture and language. Employers may also obtain domestic
help through international employment agencies,124 resulting in
and prosecution of trafficking cases, it is more likely that significant numbers of
traffickers can be stopped.”).
117
See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002 WL 1964806, at *5-8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
118
See I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii), (G)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii), (G)(v).
119
Id. § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(iii).
120
See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14 (explaining the types of special
visas and their limitations).
121
I.N.A. § 101(a)(15)(G)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(v).
122
See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 4.
123
“Some trafficking victims, in the United States, are domestic workers
brought over from their country of origin by non-U.S. employees of the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), or foreign diplomats living in the United
States.” Joshi, supra note 27, at 46 (footnote omitted). See Azmy, supra note 44, at
993.
124
See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 10 (telling the story of one
employee of a Middle Eastern mission to the U.N. who “met an employment agent in
Bangladesh who promised her a job in her employer’s country of origin, where she
worked briefly as a domestic worker for her employer’s brother before agreeing to come
to the United States to work for her employer” (footnote omitted)).
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situations where a worker arrives in the U.S. by plane125
without ever having met her employer, even though the
worker’s visa bears her employer’s name. Because the visas
are contingent on employment for the listed employer, workers
who do escape exploitative situations lose their legal nonimmigrant status in the U.S. and may be subject to deportation
if discovered by immigration enforcement authorities.126
Employers further exercise control by confiscating passports
and other documents on arrival.127
The State Department issues approximately 4,000 visas
annually for domestic workers employed by diplomats, U.N.,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (“I.M.F.”) and
O.A.S. officials.128 Through the U.N. Headquarters in New
York alone, “[t]here are nearly 800 migrant domestic workers
with special visas.”129 The World Bank and the I.M.F.’s
employees together had over 1000 G-5 visa workers in the U.S.
in 2000.130
Human Rights Watch reports that “[t]he special visa
programs for domestic workers are conducive to and facilitate
the violation of the workers’ human rights.”131 Because the
procedure for obtaining a G-5 or A-3 visa requires evidence of a
fair contract,132 employers often draft and sign fraudulent
125
9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(d) (Sept. 27, 2001) (“The employer must pay the
domestic’s initial travel expenses to the United States.”).
126
“[W]omen trafficked for domestic service may be provided legitimate visas
to work in the destination country. For these women, their immigrant status in a
foreign country may specifically depend on their employer . . . .” Inglis, supra note 68,
at 97 (footnote omitted). See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 1 (“Ironically, their
special visas exacerbate their vulnerability to abuse.”). A G-5 visa “is only valid as long
as the person works for the diplomatic family.” Kelley, supra note 7.
127
See Inglis, supra note 68, at 97:

Control over a woman’s immigration status, including the ability to confiscate
her immigration documents, and threats to modify that status can serve as a
license for the dominant party to further exploit and abuse. Thus, trafficked
women with legal status are still highly vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and
fear of seeking assistance because of the temporary or dependent nature of
their immigration status.
Id. (footnote omitted).
128
Aslam, supra note 4.
129
Sengupta, supra note 1.
130
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 36.
131
Id. at 2; see Kelley, supra note 7 (“Human rights experts are starting to
point to the homes of diplomats as potentially dangerous workplaces for vulnerable
foreign workers.”).
132
The U.S. Dep’t of State Foreign Affairs Manual provides:
Among other issues, a consular officer must be satisfied that the wage to be
received by the A-3, G-5 or NATO-7 applicant is a fair wage. . . . To insure
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contracts for that purpose alone.133 Typically the worker never
receives a copy of the contract, and cannot even read what she
signs because she is not literate or the document is in an
unfamiliar language.134 Employers may select the workers they
think will be most susceptible to forced labor, and remain free
from worry about the consequences when they know they have
diplomatic immunity.135
In many cases, the domestic worker is told upon arrival
at the U.S. home that if she leaves the home she will be
arrested, deported, or even killed.136 Workers who come from
countries where the government and police are not to be
trusted may not be surprised when told that they will be locked
up if found on the street, or that they should never speak to

that the applicant will receive a fair wage, applications for such visas must
include an employment contract signed by the employer and the employee.
The contract must include the following elements: (1) A guarantee the
employee will be compensated at the state or federal minimum or prevailing
wage, whichever is greater (Please note that the consular officer must be
satisfied that any money deducted for food or lodging is no more than
reasonable); (2) A promise by the employee not to accept any other
employment while working for the employer; (3) A promise by the employer
not to withhold the passport of the employee; and (4) A statement indicating
that both parties understand that the employee cannot be required to remain
on the premises after working hours without compensation.
9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(a) (Sept. 27, 2001). But see Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 2
(noting that although the State Department requires submission of employment
contracts for domestic workers that meet certain terms in order to issue visas, it
neither enforces the contracts nor keeps them on file for later reference); 9 FAM 41.21
N6.2(c) (Sept. 27, 2001) (“the Department [of State] or individual consular officers are
not in a position to enforce behavior of employers or employees when in the United
States”).
133
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 24 (“Seven domestic workers
explained to Human Rights Watch that their employers explicitly told them that their
employment contracts were signed to satisfy U.S. consular offices’ requirements, were
not binding, and were not intended to govern their employment relationships in the
United States.”). Through a review of forty cases, Human Rights Watch estimated that
the actual median hourly wage was $2.14 or 42% of the minimum wage. Id. at 17.
134
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also Press Release, ACLU,
Diplomats Should Keep their Own Houses in Order, Advocates for Domestic Workers
Say (Apr. 7, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=17964&c=36
(“migrant domestic workers are extremely vulnerable to exploitation for a variety of
reasons including unfamiliarity with their domestic and international rights, cultural
and language barriers”); Kelley, supra note 7 (“the isolated nature of domestic labor
leads to abuses easily committed and repeated outside of the public eye.”).
135
“The problems [of migrant domestic workers being especially vulnerable to
exploitation] are compounded when the employers can claim immunity from civil and
criminal jurisdiction due to their status as diplomats.” Press Release, ACLU, supra
note 134. See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 19 (sharing the story of a former
domestic employee of a European diplomat who told her “he was a diplomat and could
do whatever he wanted with her because the U.S. justice system could not reach him”).
136
Azmy, supra note 44, at 994-95.
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anyone outside of the house.137 The lack of monitoring by any
U.S. agencies of the employment conditions of domestic
workers who receive special visas makes abuses even less
visible.138 Even in the rare cases where abuses come to light, if
employers invoke diplomatic immunity they escape
consequences for their actions.
B.

Diplomatic Immunity

Diplomatic immunity is governed by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,139 and has long been the
customary practice of nations including the U.S.140 U.S. law
and international law recognize several levels of diplomatic
immunity.141 Full immunity “from the criminal, civil, and
administrative jurisdiction of the United States”142 extends to
diplomatic agents,143 diplomatic-level staff of missions to
international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.,144
and their families.145 These individuals are immune from

137

Id. at 994-95 nn.69-70.
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 2 (“Neither the State Department,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), nor the Department of Labor (DOL)
monitors employer treatment of migrant domestic workers with special visas.”).
139
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
140
See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Phila. Ct. of
Oyer & Terminer 1784) (incorporating the customary international law of diplomatic
immunity into the municipal law of Pennsylvania); see also Jacques Hartmann, The
Gillon Affair, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 745, 748 (2005) (noting that the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations “expresses a codification of customary
international law”).
141
See Veronica L. Maginnis, Note, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons
Learned from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 989, 993-94 (2003) (defining diplomatic immunity).
142
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 34; see Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
143
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 464 (1987) (“A
diplomatic agent of a state, accredited to and accepted by another state, is
immune . . . from arrest, detention, criminal process, and, in general, civil process in
the receiving state.”).
144
Id. § 470 (“Under applicable international agreements, permanent
representatives of member states to the principal international organizations are
generally entitled to the same privileges and immunities in the headquarters state as
are accorded diplomatic agents of a state accredited to another state.”).
145
Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from Criminal
Jurisdiction: Summary of Law Enforcement Aspects, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/20047.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Diplomatic and Consular
Privileges].
138
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arrest146 and may simply invoke immunity rather than respond
to any allegations in a civil complaint.147
Consular officers148 and most employees of organizations
like the U.N. have only functional immunity, limited to acts
taken in an official capacity.149 The U.S. may subject them to
criminal, civil, or administrative jurisdiction for acts taken
outside the scope of their official duties. Members of the
technical and administrative staff of diplomatic missions and
their family members are fully immune from criminal
jurisdiction, but do not enjoy diplomatic immunity from civil or
administrative jurisdiction unless the acts in question are
related to the performance of their job.150 A trafficking victim
can bring a civil suit under the TVPRA against such an
employer with limited immunity, but the likelihood of actually
recovering a judgment is slim since the defendant’s assets may
be in their home country, and international organizations
including the U.N., O.A.S., I.M.F. and World Bank assert
immunity from garnishment orders against their employees’
salaries.151
In cases where a defendant asserts diplomatic or
consular immunity, the State Department generally issues a
certification to the court indicating the status of the defendant
and the level of immunity to which he or she is entitled.152 The
U.S. Department of State can request a waiver from a
diplomat’s home country in order to subject him or her to U.S.
jurisdiction. Because diplomatic immunity is a right of the
home state and not the individual, the sending country may
waive it.153 The Foreign Affairs Manual, which is not U.S. law
or regulation but outlines internal State Department policy,154

146

Id.
See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 11.
148
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 465 (1987) (“A
consular officer of a state, commissioned to and accepted by another state, is
immune . . . from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process in respect of acts or
omissions in the exercise of the officer’s official functions.”); Diplomatic and Consular
Privileges, supra note 145.
149
See Maginnis, supra note 141, at 1012-13.
150
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35; see Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations art. 37, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
151
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35.
152
2 FAM 234.1-1 (Feb. 28, 1991).
153
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 32, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see Hartmann, supra note 140, at 753.
154
See Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 23-24 (describing the authority
of the FAM).
147
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asserts that “Department of State general policy is to request a
waiver of immunity from criminal jurisdiction in all criminal
cases involving foreign personnel with such immunity,” with
exceptions, where justified, for “overriding foreign relations,
national security, or humanitarian concerns.”155 If the sending
country refuses to waive its diplomat’s immunity and allow the
U.S. to prosecute “serious offenses,” the diplomat is not to be
permitted to remain in the U.S.156
In practice, the U.S. fails to request waivers of
diplomatic immunity to enable trafficking prosecutions.157 In
2000, the Department of State claimed that “no case charging
the diplomat employer of a domestic worker with criminal
conduct ha[d] come to its attention.”158 Even if the Department
of State follows its own policy and requests a waiver to enable
prosecution, the sending country can refuse to grant it.159 In
the civil context, there is not even a Department of State policy
on requests for waivers of immunity.160
While prosecutorial focus on domestic servitude
trafficking is minimal to begin with,161 perceived immunity of
potential defendants also greatly deters investigations. In one
New York case where a domestic worker made allegations of
false imprisonment against her diplomat employers, a police
spokesman noted that the employers were not arrested because
of diplomatic immunity, but that “the Police Department made
no determination as to whether the case, based on its merits,
could be prosecuted.”162 The Department of State in turn
commented that it “would have sought a waiver of
155
156

2 FAM 232.4 (Feb. 28, 1991).
2 FAM 233.3(a)(3) (Feb. 28, 1991); see Hidden in the Home, supra note 14,

at 35.
157
See Kelley, supra note 7 (“Lawyers have repeatedly filed suits [on behalf of
domestic workers] in the face of diplomatic immunity, only to be stonewalled by the
United States or other governments.”).
158
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35.
159
See Ryan Gallagher, County Hears Perils of Modern Slavery, THE
SENTINEL NEWSPAPERS (Maryland), Feb. 19, 2005, http://www.thesentinel.com/print/
303286567656083.php.
160
See 2 FAM 234.2 (Feb. 28, 1991); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002
WL 1964806, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002) (State Department submitted a statement
of interest supporting immunity rather than requesting waiver of immunity from the
government of Bangladesh); Knab v. Republic of Georgia, No. 97CV3118, 1998 WL
34067108, at *3 (D.D.C. May 29, 1998) (holding that a home country’s waiver of
immunity from criminal jurisdiction does not also constitute waiver from civil
jurisdiction); Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 35.
161
See supra Part III.E.
162
Sengupta, supra note 1.
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immunity . . . had the police referred the case for
prosecution.”163 In the politically delicate arena of diplomatic
immunity, each agency involved may shift responsibility onto
another, until it is no longer clear at which point in the process
a breakdown occurred.
C.

The Need for a Remedy
1. The Prevalence of Trafficking by Diplomats

Non-governmental organizations rally against this form
of “modern day slavery,”164 particularly in communities like
Washington, D.C. and New York City that host international
organizations whose employees may import household help
using special visas.165 Advocacy groups estimate that one-third
of their domestic servitude cases implicate diplomats with
immunity.166 One organization in Washington, D.C. has seen
approximately a thousand cases of domestic worker
exploitation by employers with immunity since its inception in
1967.167
The
combined
numbers
of
diplomats
and
representatives to international organizations residing in the
U.S. create a significant demand for domestic workers.168 That
demand is frequently satisfied by trafficking women from
foreign countries under false promises to abide by U.S. law.169
While these international organizations are involved in the
visa process170 and can exercise control over their employees,
they fail to act to prevent their employees from repeatedly
trafficking workers into their homes and abusing them.171 For
example, the U.N. has yet to discipline any employee for
mistreatment of a G-5 domestic worker.172
163

Id.
See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 5 (“[h]uman trafficking is also
called ‘modern day slavery’”).
165
Sun, supra note 8.
166
Id.
167
Aslam, supra note 4 (quoting the head of the Spanish Catholic Center).
168
Azmy, supra note 44, at 993.
169
Id.
170
Such organizations as the U.N., O.A.S., I.M.F. and World Bank “assist
their employees with the process of applying for domestic workers and endorse
completed visa applications.” Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 36.
171
Id. at 36-39 (describing the organization-wide requirements of the I.M.F.,
World Bank, U.N. and O.A.S. for employees who obtain special visas for domestic help).
172
Id. at 38.
164
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The dramatic failure of justice in these particular cases
warrants immediate remedy. Diplomats and employees of
organizations like the I.M.F. or the World Bank sometimes fail
to pay servants brought from their home countries, and abuse
them “physically, emotionally and sexually.”173 Attorneys who
represent exploited domestic workers report a disproportionate
number of trafficking cases in which the perpetrators are
This
employed by such international organizations.174
widespread pattern of worker exploitation in the diplomatic
community will continue unchecked until the U.S. holds
perpetrators accountable.175 Also, because victims of this type
of trafficking arrive alone to this country and lack knowledge of
potential remedies, these cases are severely underreported.176
An official at the World Bank admitted to Human Rights
Watch that “the fact that there were not many cases that came
forward was not indicative of the number of cases.”177
What is ironic for the women in this situation, is that many of the
officials and diplomats that they work for are members of
institutions, including: the United Nations, the World Bank, and
Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the Organization of American States. The goal of many of
these government agencies is to reduce human suffering and slavery
throughout the world.178

This irony, combined with the situs of the events in
major U.S. cities, underscores the egregious nature of such
violations. The U.S. purports to be the global leader in the
eradication of trafficking179 and thus must prevent the import of
workers into involuntary servitude inside its own borders.
2. Failures of Justice
Prosecutors have not brought criminal charges against a
diplomat under the VTVPA or its predecessor laws because of
173

See HumanTrafficking.com, Human Trafficking 101: Who Are the
Traffickers?, http://www.humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/trafficking_ht3/who_
traffickers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
174
Kelley, supra note 7.
175
King, supra note 8, at A21 (“many of today’s human traffickers and slavers
are diplomats, flaunting U.S. and local laws, under the protective shield of the [State]
[D]epartment’s interpretation of diplomatic immunity”).
176
Gallagher, supra note 159 (“reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg”).
177
Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 32.
178
Murphy, supra note 11, at 13-14.
179
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (June 2006),
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006.
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the immunity barrier.
Government resources for antitrafficking prosecutions are so limited to begin with,180 they are
unlikely to be wasted on a case where a waiver of immunity
must be requested and may be refused.181
Victims bring civil cases against diplomat traffickers
without success. In 1996, a domestic servant sued a Counsellor
of the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, D.C. for numerous
claims including false imprisonment and violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.182 This case, like others brought before
the TVPRA created a private right of action for trafficking
victims in 2003, relied on a patchwork of civil rights legislation,
contract and tort claims. The court considered the exception to
diplomatic immunity for “commercial activity” within the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,183 but ultimately
held that employment of household workers is not commercial
activity.184 In 2001, a U.S. District Court dismissed on grounds
of diplomatic immunity the case brought by a domestic servant
with an A-3 visa against her consular officer employer.185
Similarly, another District Court dismissed the suit brought in
2002 by a domestic servant against the Economic Minister to
the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the U.N..186 In that
case the State Department provided formal certifications
indicating that the defendants had full diplomatic immunity,
which the court accepted.187
Victims trafficked by the staff of international
organizations or by diplomatic staff often face heightened
exploitation because of the fact that their employers can claim
immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction.188 Secure in the
knowledge that they may invoke immunity if their human
rights abuses are uncovered, these traffickers feel they can act
with impunity.189 Thus, in part because of immunity, “[m]any of
the worst cases of abuse of domestic workers involve these
180

See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part IV.B.
182
Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
183
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
184
Tabion, 73 F.3d at 537-39.
185
Park v. Shin, No. C-01-1800 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11580 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 8, 2001).
186
Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224, 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2002).
187
Id.
188
Statement Submitted by Global Rights and the ACLU, supra note 41, at 2.
189
Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 62.
181
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foreign officials.”190
Ambassadors’ and dignitaries’ own
awareness of their immunity from prosecution increases their
propensity to commit crimes they view as insignificant and
victimless.191 Victims report that employers “flaunt their
diplomatic immunity.”192 Traffickers who essentially enslave
other human beings often face nothing greater than a transfer
by their organization from the U.S. to a post in another country
as the sole consequence of their acts.193 Those who do remain in
the U.S. are left free to induce a new victim to work for them
Although Congress
and continue the cycle of abuse.194
furnished strong anti-trafficking tools in the 2000 VTVPA and
2003 TVPRA, these tools often lie useless where their
application intersects with the doctrine of diplomatic
immunity. For that reason, the U.S. must adopt an innovative
strategy towards human trafficking crimes committed by
immunized individuals.
V.

CLOSING THE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY LOOPHOLE

A.

Monitoring Employers Who Obtain Special Visas for
Domestic Workers

Organizations like the U.N., the O.A.S., the World Bank
and the I.M.F. should take greater responsibility for their
employees’ treatment of domestic workers. Disciplinary actions
taken by the U.N. in particular would help legitimize its role in
fomenting the global cooperation critical to a more effective
The problem of
international anti-trafficking effort.195
trafficking of domestic workers by members of the diplomatic
community is well known to organizations like the U.N.,196 but
190

Azmy, supra note 44, at 993-94.
Kelley, supra note 7.
192
Id.
193
“In some cases . . . employers have been transferred to a position in a
different country, in order to avoid charges or penalty.” Statement Submitted by Global
Rights and the ACLU, supra note 41, at 3.
194
While the Foreign Affairs Manual of the State Department requires certain
terms in the contract for a domestic worker before it will improve an employer’s
request for a special visa, it does not prohibit employers who breach those terms from
subsequently obtaining a visa for another domestic worker. Hidden in the Home, supra
note 14, at 25. Similarly, extensions to these visas are granted without any review of
the employer’s treatment of the domestic worker. Id.
195
See Potts, supra note 81, at 249.
196
“It was noted that some of the exploiters of migrant domestic workers
belonged to the diplomatic community. The Working Group recommended that
whenever cases of abuse involving diplomats were proved, diplomatic immunity should
191

1164

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

thus far has not been adequately addressed. Curiously, the
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights addressed the violation of
human rights of the domestic workers of diplomats by
recommending that “States must ensure that diplomatic status
does not provide impunity for such human rights violations.”197
One Washington, D.C. organization worked with the
World Bank and the I.M.F., pressuring those organizations to
give their officials codes of conduct to govern their treatment of
domestic workers brought to the U.S. on special visas.198
Despite the organization’s agreement to establishing a
procedure for abused workers to file complaints, in practice
“[w]orkers who have filed complaints have endured monthslong delays and hostility when they finally meet with World
Bank officials.”199 While they may instruct their employees to
follow U.S. laws, many organizations remain reluctant to
intrude into the private realm of the homes of their employees.
They may rather resolve claims that arise by means of a quiet
settlement rather than exposing their own employees to
embarrassment. This type of concealment contributes to the
notion of some officials that they act with impunity. Formal
monitoring and an awareness campaign by the U.N. and other
international organizations would help defeat such notions.
Congress, which possesses broad powers to regulate
immigration into the U.S.,200 could act to restrict the State
Department’s issuance of A-3 and G-5 visas. Human Rights
Watch suggests that Congress should require the State
Department to evaluate the record of a diplomat or employee of
an international organization before issuance of the visa,
denying domestic worker visas for life to employers who
commit egregious violations including servitude, forced labor,
be lifted and sanctions applied.” Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms
of Slavery on its Thirtieth Session, supra note 46; see Report of the Working Group on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, supra note 14 (noting
the proposal by a member of the Working Group that it “consider the exploitation of
domestic staff by diplomats”).
197
Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its
Thirtieth Session, supra note 46, at 15.
198
See Foo, supra note 8, at 57-58 (describing the activities of the Campaign
for Migrant Domestic Workers, an organization whose “focus is on domestic workers
employed by diplomats and officials of the World Bank and IMF”).
199
Id. at 58.
200
STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW & POLICY 120 (4th
ed. 2005) (“Despite continuing uncertainty about the precise source of the federal
immigration power, it is settled law today that the power exists.”).
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and physical or sexual abuse.201 But it is unclear how a
diplomat’s record would ever bear evidence of these types of
violations as long as he or she is immune from the exercise of
U.S. jurisdiction. With this solution, as with the abolition of
special visa availability altogether, the possibility would
remain that diplomats denied a special visa to import a
domestic worker might simply exploit undocumented workers
or workers in the U.S. on visitor visas.
B.

Educating Law Enforcement on the Limits of Immunity

Law enforcement personnel and prosecutors need
education and encouragement to pursue investigations and
prosecutions of perpetrators of VTVPA crimes who lack full
immunity. Often police officers assume that any foreign
representative is fully immune from civil and criminal
jurisdiction in the U.S.,202 while in fact only diplomats,
particularly high-level representatives of international
organizations, and their families may invoke such absolute
immunity.203 Police and prosecutors should be encouraged to
undertake investigations and indictments of consular officials
and employees of organizations who have only functional
immunity.204 Even in the case of an individual who can invoke
absolute immunity, issuance of an arrest warrant or
indictment can serve a future function if the individual later
loses his or her diplomatic status.205 Congress should require
the State Department to provide education and an awareness
campaign for U.S. law enforcement on the meaning of
immunity and its differing levels. Similarly, advocates should
assist trafficking victims with filing civil claims under the
TVPRA against employers who are not immune from civil
jurisdiction.206

201

Hidden in the Home, supra note 14, at 41.
“The police reaction to discovering that a suspect is a foreign diplomat is
often ‘instant paralysis.’” Don Oberdorfer, Papua New Guinea Recalls Diplomat;
Serious Auto Accident Cited; New U.S. Policies Highlighted, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,
1987, at B1.
203
See supra Part IV.B.
204
See supra Part IV.B.
205
See Oberdorfer, supra note 202.
206
Even if such a suit results in a judgment for the plaintiff, several potential
bars to recovery remain. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. However,
positive outcomes might include increased publicity of the trafficking problem and the
possibility of settlements beneficial to victims.
202
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The State Department should also educate police and
prosecutors about its policy of requesting waivers of diplomatic
immunity in criminal cases. Encouraging investigation of
diplomatic trafficking cases and educating law enforcement
personnel would be the gateway to actual waiver requests.
C.

Mandating Diplomatic Immunity Waiver Requests

After the education of law enforcement professionals,
the Department of State must also follow suit and request
waivers in cases where prosecutors want to proceed.207 Even if
all investigations do not result in formal charges or convictions,
the investigations themselves might work to counteract the
notion of some diplomats and officials of international
organizations that they can act with impunity while in the
U.S.. Drawing more law enforcement attention to what is often
a hidden problem may result in publicity and media attention,
which could be a deterrent to traffickers as well as the impetus
for a sending country to actually grant a waiver request.
However, it is far more likely that the sending country
would simply relocate the defendant to another country rather
than consent to waive immunity. If a sending country refuses
to grant a waiver but keeps its diplomat in the same post, the
host country may strip the individual of his or her special
status, requiring the “persona non grata”208 to leave the
country.209 The U.S. could develop a policy to declare any
accused trafficker a persona non grata in the absence of
approval of the waiver request by the sending country.
However, forcing a diplomat to leave the country still fails to
prove and punish his or her crimes, and civil suits to
compensate victims would remain barred.

207
See Report of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its
Thirtieth Session, supra note 46, at 9 (“The Working Group recommended that
whenever cases of abuse involving diplomats were proved, diplomatic immunity should
be lifted and sanctions should be applied.”).
208
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95; Maginnis, supra note 141, at 1003 (“The declaration of persona non grata
is usually reserved for behavior such as espionage, terrorism, or other subversive
activity, but can be used in other circumstances.”).
209
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95; Maginnis, supra note 141, at 993-94.
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Prosecution of Diplomats under Jus Cogens

In the worst trafficking cases, where diplomats
essentially enslave their imported domestic help, the U.S.
should deny diplomat traffickers the defense of immunity
under the jus cogens principle of international law. A jus
cogens norm is “a peremptory norm of general international
law.”210 Jus cogens norms embody the only universal policy
rules in the international system.211 The concept of a jus cogens
norm encompasses both a substantive idea, such as genocide or
slavery, and a “command prohibiting any derogation from the
substantive provision.”212 While the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations213 binds the U.S., the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties are invalid if they
violate jus cogens norms.214 Diplomatic immunity is also
mandated by customary international law,215 a source of
international law derived from consistent practice of nationstates coupled with a sense of legal obligation on their part.216
Jus cogens invalidates customary rules that conflict with
peremptory norms just as it invalidates treaties.217 Jus cogens
norms emerge through their recognition by the international
community as that which can never be legal.218
The illegality of slavery is established under customary
international law and is a peremptory jus cogens norm.219
210

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
211
REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (4th Ed. 2002);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (5th Ed. 2003); see Jonathan I. Charney,
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 542 (1993) (explaining that today
jus cogens norms emerge when “the international legal system determines for moral,
practical or political reasons that a rule of law shall be established, notwithstanding
some objections, and that exceptions from it cannot be tolerated.”).
212
CHRISTOS L. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES 12 (1976).
213
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
214
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
215
See 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Permanent Mission, 988 F.2d 295, 299-300 (2d
Cir. 1993) (describing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as a codification
of historical, customary practices of nations).
216
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987)
(defining customary international law as a source of international law).
217
SHAW, supra note 211, at 117.
218
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
219
Tom Obokata, Human Trafficking, Human Rights and Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 410, 414 (2003)
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International humanitarian law condemns slavery as a crime
against humanity.220 Because human trafficking is the modernday embodiment of slavery,221 it violates jus cogens. Thus,
treaties providing for diplomatic immunity may be void where
their application would shield perpetrators of slavery-like
practices prohibited under jus cogens.222 This approach need
not invalidate the diplomatic immunity treaties in their
entirety; it merely suggests that where their application
violates a jus cogens norm, they must not be applied.223 Insofar
as treaty law shields diplomats from prosecution for trafficking
individuals into domestic service, that treaty law violates jus
cogens norms related to slavery and human rights.
By recognizing the immunity of perpetrators of
diplomatic trafficking,224 the U.S. effectively acquiesces in the
persistence of this form of modern-day slavery. Affirmative
obligations to outlaw, investigate, prosecute and punish
trafficking offenses are established in modern international
law.225 Allowing the jus cogens prohibition of slavery to trump
diplomatic immunity treaties is consistent with the growing
international sentiment that states not only have the ability to
outlaw trafficking but the affirmative obligation to do so.226
The jus cogens argument differs from an argument
against diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction
because trafficking is not “merely the commission of a hideous

(“Prohibition of slavery is also part of customary international law and constitutes jus
cogens.”); Rassam, supra note 14, at 809-10 (“The prohibition of slavery . . . is a
preemptory norm of customary international law and jus cogens as well as a crime
against humanity.”).
220
Rassam, supra note 14, at 834.
221
See Azmy, supra note 44, at 983; Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 14, at 5;
Murphy, supra note 11, at 13; Rassam, supra note 14, at 824; Richard, supra note 24, at
447.
222
See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754 (arguing that if the prohibition
of torture is a jus cogens norm, “this norm would necessarily trump any other rule of
international law, even immunity”).
223
“Any legal act of whatever nature and, hence, any international agreement
is unlawful in so far as it infringes a rule of the jus cogens.” ROZAKIS, supra note 212,
at 17 (quoting Suy, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law 75).
224
See supra Parts I and II.
225
Obokata, supra note 219, at 418; see Report of the Working Group on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its Twenty-Eighth Session, supra note 14, at 13
(affirming that “slavery, in all its forms and practices, is a crime against humanity and
that any acquiescence by a State in such practices . . . constitutes a grave violation of
basic human rights”).
226
See Obokata, supra note 219, at 411 (discussing the dual duties of states to
fight trafficking and to address the human rights implications of trafficking).
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criminal offense,” but is “a direct violation of human rights.”227
The first human right recognized worldwide was an affirmative
right to live free from slavery.228 Under jus cogens, the U.S.
could argue that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations should not apply to immunize a defendant in a
trafficking case because the prohibition against slavery
supersedes treaty law. Thus, a court accepting this premise
could proceed with a prosecution against a diplomat accused of
trafficking for domestic servitude, or a civil suit brought by his
or her victim in pursuit of damages, without regard to
diplomatic immunity.
The international community is growing to recognize
that violations of human rights that conflict with jus cogens
prohibitions might supersede claims of sovereign immunity,229 a
concept closely linked to diplomatic immunity.230 U.S. courts
have already struggled with jus cogens violations in the context
of sovereign immunity under the Federal Sovereign
Immunities Act. In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign
immunity where a Holocaust victim sued Germany for
damages he suffered in Nazi concentration camps.231 However,
the dissent argued forcefully that the motion to dismiss was
correctly denied because Germany’s violations of jus cogens
norms in its treatment of the plaintiff constituted a waiver of
sovereign immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities
Act.232
One scholar argues that Denmark should have applied
the jus cogens prohibition of torture to prosecute an admitted
torturer sent by Israel to Denmark as its Ambassador in

227

Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Council of Europe Takes Action Against
Human Trafficking, 21 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. No. 10, 1 (Oct. 2005).
228
Rassam, supra note 14, at 827.
229
Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754; see, e.g., Al-Adsani v. Gov’t of Kuwait,
100 ILR 465, 471 (A.C. 1994) (suggesting that sovereign immunity may not be a
defense to allegations of torture).
230
4 AM. JUR. 2D Ambassadors, Diplomats & Consular Officials § 7 (2005)
(“Diplomatic immunity is not a privilege of the person, but of the state that the
diplomatic agent represents.”).
231
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
232
Id. (Wald, J., dissenting). “Germany waived its sovereign immunity by
violating the jus cogens norms of international law condemning enslavement and
genocide.” Id. at 1179. See also Shaw, supra note 211, at 118-19 (“it has been
suggested that state conduct violating a rule of jus cogens may not attract a claim of
state immunity”).
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2001,233 resolving the conflict between Denmark’s right to
prosecute under the Convention Against Torture234 and its
obligations to respect diplomatic immunity under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.235 The U.S. should take a
similar approach in trafficking cases, prioritizing the
fulfillment of its international obligation to combat severe
human rights violations over its adherence to the principle of
diplomatic immunity.
Prosecution of a U.N. official or diplomat who engaged
in particularly aggravated behavior would also serve to focus
the attention of the media, the public,236 and the diplomatic
community on the gravity of the problem. This in turn might
spur law enforcement awareness237 and improve the monitoring
practices of international organizations.238 It would also pave
the way for the U.S. and other nations to assert jurisdiction
over diplomats who commit other heinous crimes which
implicate peremptory jus cogens norms, fostering adjustments
in the global system of diplomatic immunity.239
VI.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. “has been at the forefront of the fight against
While diplomatic
modern slavery and forced labor.”240
immunity remains an important principle, the U.S. should
further its leadership role in global anti-trafficking work by
eradicating the practices of human trafficking, forced labor and
involuntary
servitude
perpetrated
by
immunized
241
representatives on U.S. soil. Diplomatic immunity should not
trump international human rights norms or constitutional

233

Hartmann, supra note 140, at 754.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art.7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
235
Hartmann, supra note 140, at 750.
236
“[P]opular indifference also supports trafficking. Today, few Americans are
aware of the problem or consider it relevant to their lives.” Walter, supra note 14, at
139.
237
Advocated for supra in Part V.B.
238
Recommended supra in Part V.A.
239
See supra Part V.E .
240
Hidden Slaves, supra note 38, at 73.
241
“Although on the surface the United States takes a harsh stance towards
human rights violators, the most egregious human rights violations exist, sometimes
undetected, within its own borders.” Candes, supra note 52, at 575.
234
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prohibitions against slavery-like practices.242
Diplomatic
immunity is a major barrier to a significant advance enacted in
the VTVPA, the new definition of involuntary servitude. Most
of the cases prosecuted under this provision would involve
domestic workers, whose employers often invoke diplomatic
immunity.243 The civil cause of action introduced by the TVPRA
is critical for trafficking victims who may lack any resources
with which to start over after escaping a situation of domestic
servitude.244 For this reason, diplomatic immunity in the cases
described above works a double injustice: the diplomat or
international official escapes punishment, while the victim
lacks compensation.
Better monitoring of employers of domestic workers on
special visas, education for law enforcement on the levels of
immunity, and a commitment from the State Department to
request waivers of immunity from sending countries in
trafficking cases would all contribute to the resolution of this
complex problem. However, the strongest solution asserts
jurisdiction over immunized individuals based on jus cogens,
treating human trafficking like the severe human rights
violation that it is.245 The U.S. should take this bold step and
maintain its role as a forerunner in the fight against this
modern incarnation of slavery.
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